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ABSTRACT
The focus of this study was to examine the effect of ownership structure and the 
independent board chair as the moderating variable on the performance of companies in 
the finance industry of the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia. The study used a total of 185 
observation data collected from 37 finance companies from the years 2007 to 2011. The 
results of the study showed that the independent board chair as the moderating variable 
had a negative relationship with the finance companies’ Tobin’s Q value. The literature 
advocates that the independent board chair has an influence on the monitoring of owner 
managers and in safeguarding minority shareholders’ economic interest. On the other 
hand independent chair control and monitoring of company decisions can be affected by 
the dominant voice of the CEO, the majority presence of executive directors, the presence 
of owner manager and leverage.
Keywords: ownership structure, board of directors, independent board chair, firm performance, moderating 
variable
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of studying corporate 
governance and its impact on the 
performance of companies has been 
re-emphasised by the recent crisis and 
bankruptcies of big finance companies, 
which indicates the impact of poor 
governance on the performance of 
companies (Westman, 2009). Brennan 
and Solomon (2008) defined corporate 
governance as the process of ensuring that 
the management is managing the affairs of 
the company in such a way that the interest 
of the stakeholders is protected and they 
do this by supervising and controlling the 
actions of the management. Corporate 
governance was developed to oversee how 
the board is discharging its functions and 
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to provide guidance to the board on how 
to discharge those responsibilities more 
effectively (Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven, 
2011). In the case of finance companies, 
good practices of corporate governance 
mechanism are essential to oversee the 
activities of the companies are carried 
out with due care on the risk management 
(McConnell, 2012). Stakeholders’ 
confidence on the companies’ commitment 
to manage the business responsibly has 
been linked with the nature and structure of 
a corporate governance mechanism being 
set up (Jansson, 2005; Kim & Rasiah, 
2010). 
It is important that conduct related to 
corporate governance of banks is monitored 
due to the dominant role of the institutions 
in the management of the payment system 
(Capriglione & Casalino, 2014; Dermine, 
2013). Loss of confidence in the soundness 
of the banking system could bring a 
negative effect to investment in the sector, 
severe problems to the accomplishment 
of the government’s macroeconomic 
policy and great impact on the economic 
living of the depositors. Good corporate 
governance in financial institutions will 
ensure that small depositors and less 
informed investors are protected through 
continuous healthy existence of the 
financial system (Arun & Turner, 2004). 
For this role, the board of directors of a 
company has an important responsibility 
to the stakeholders to ensure that business 
activities are performed in a socially 
responsible manner (Jamali, Safieddine & 
Rabbath, 2008). The recent collapse of big 
firms in different economies has questioned 
the effectiveness of the board of directors 
in properly discharging its role in leading 
companies and monitoring the activities of 
the management. 
For instance, crises in the finance 
sector has affected economies of different 
countries at different times such as in 
Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and Indonesia (Bazdresh & Werner, 2000). 
These crises have emphasised the need 
for countries to support a sound financial 
system with good corporate governance 
practices. These corporate failures and 
financial crises increased the need for 
closer monitoring of financial institutions 
and for the regulatory authorities to reform 
their corporate governance. Some have 
undertaken the reform by issuing Sarbanes 
Oxley’s Act of 2002 in the United States 
and in the United Kingdom by forming 
several committees such as Cadbury 
(1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998), 
Higgs (2003) and Smith committee 
(2003), whose recommendations were 
later harmonised into a combined code, 
to deal with several aspects of corporate 
governance (Leuz & Wysocki, 2008). 
One of the requirements of most corporate 
governance movements such as the 
combined codes (1998, revised in 2003, 
2006, 2012 ), Kings report (1994, 2002) 
and the Sarbanes Oxley’s Act of 2002, is 
the need for the strengthening of the role 
of the board in monitoring, particularly 
through board substructure. As a result of 
corporate fraud and the various economic 
and financial crises that led to companies’ 
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failures and bankruptcy in different parts 
of the world, regulatory authorities and 
the accounting profession developed and 
improved corporate governance codes 
to strengthen corporate governance 
practice and establish measures to ensure 
compliance by companies (Ghazali, 2010). 
The recent global financial crisis which 
affected economies of the world provided 
evidence of the various impact that can 
range from reduction in international trade, 
foreign direct investment, collapse of capital 
market, fall in value of currencies, increase 
in unemployment, large expenditure 
by the authorities to rescue the affected 
companies and ultimately a decrease in 
economic growth (Atik, 2009). The nature 
of ownership structure of a company which 
provided little incentive for monitoring 
by the dispersed shareholders and poor 
governing performance by the board of 
directors hasbeen identified to contribute 
to the crisis (Westman, 2009). Poor 
performance of finance companies because 
of poor management could cause a liquidity 
problem in the financial system that in turn 
could lead to crisis in the economy and the 
eventual loss of confidence in finance firms 
(Htay, Ab. Rashid, Adnan, & Meera, 2011). 
According to Turlea, Mocanu & Radu 
(2010) stakeholders of finance companies 
have divergent goals and objectives. Equity 
holders, for example, are concerned about 
the value of their investment which could 
decrease if there was poor performance 
while debt holders and depositors, on the 
other hand, are interested in ensuring their 
investments and deposits are safeguarded. 
The importance of relevant corporate 
governance in finance companies also 
relates to the fact that finance companies 
are closely related to each other and are 
transforming into one financial institution 
that offers similar services through its 
different subsidiaries (Gopinath, 2008). 
It is becoming difficult to differentiate 
between commercial and investment banks 
and insurance firms as banks diversify 
into finance firms that provide both retail 
and investment banking services as well 
as other finance-related services (Walter 
& Saunders, 2011). These changes in 
the nature of the business of the finance 
sector and the high level of risk involved 
as a result of expanding the scope of their 
business are requiring regulators to update 
and revise their regulation requirements 
regularly to enforce effective monitoring 
(Brighi & Venturelli, 2014). 
Although finance firms in Malaysia 
were not seriously affected by the global 
financial crisis, some still felt the impact 
with regards to stock prices and profitability 
(Wasiuzzaman & Gunasegava, 2013). The 
recent global financial crisis has shown how 
connected and interrelated companies in 
the finance sector are and how governance 
problems in one part of the sector could 
have an impact on the entire economy 
(Erkens, Hung & Matos, 2012). This 
closeness in the companies could create 
problems since poor governance in one part 
of the sector could lead to its collapse and 
in turn affect the financial system and the 
economy at large (Becht, Bolton & Roell, 
2012). This was evidenced from the recent 
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financial crisis, which started from one 
segment of the finance sector and spread to 
other segments and affected the economy 
of countries in the world such as US, UK, 
Belgium, The Netherlands, Austria, Spain, 
Germany, Ireland, Greece and Sweden 
(Becht et al., 2012).
These and similar events have 
prompted the regulatory authorities 
to institute more safeguards on the 
governance of financial institutions in the 
form of guidance on board composition 
and appointments, establishment of 
committees, for example the risk 
management committee, and monitoring 
of risks of the entities (Becht et al., 
2012). Furthermore, governance of 
finance companies is unique due to the 
higher information asymmetry in such 
institutions, which requires greater 
monitoring to reduce the asymmetry 
(Zulkafli & Abdul Samad, 2007). The 
banking segment of the finance industry 
is very important to the economies of 
developing countries because it is the 
main channel for raising finance by private 
investors (Sufian & Habibullah, 2010). 
Another factor that makes the finance 
companies more important in Malaysia is 
due to the over protection of the banking 
industry, which made other non-bank 
financial institutions less developed, 
and under development of the capital 
market and risk management exercise 
(Thillainathan, 1999). 
The high information asymmetry 
in finance firms could arise due to the 
difference in the interest of shareholders, 
depositors, investment account holders, 
managers and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance of finance 
companies is very important because they 
are the main depository of the economy, 
due to complexity of their operations, 
interest of different stakeholders and their 
roles in an economy, which makes them 
subject to stringent regulations (Arun & 
Turner, 2004; Turlea et al., 2010). The 
effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanisms aimed at enhancing 
performance in finance companies is of 
interest to people because of the interest 
of different stakeholders and the extent of 
losses suffered by investors and the general 
public from the global financial crisis, 
the Asian financial crisis and the various 
corporate failures and crises in the finance 
sector. which seem to be a recurring event 
with crises occurring about 11 times in 
30 years (Dermine, 2013). The difference 
in objectives and interest of stakeholders 
exists, for example, between shareholders, 
debt holders and regulators. Shareholders 
may be short-term focused and prefer 
investment that are risky but have high 
returns while debt-holders and regulators 
have long-term focus and may prefer 
low risk and stable investment (Mehran, 
Morrsion & Shapiro, 2011). The depositors 
are interested in safeguarding their 
deposits, the investors are concerned about 
their investments and the management is 
concerned about their employment while 
the government is interested in continued 
existence and health of the finance sector 
and the economy in general. 
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The finance sector provides an 
intermediary role in the economy by 
channelling funds from surplus sectors 
to deficit sectors, therefore corporate 
governance in such sectors is important 
since poor corporate governance could lead 
to poor management of the business of the 
firms in the sector, thereby affecting their 
performance and the performance of other 
sectors that depend on them for financing 
(Htay et al., 2011). People are concerned 
about corporate governance mechanisms 
aimed at protecting stakeholder interest as 
a result of the extent of losses suffered by 
investors and the general public from the 
global financial crisis, the Asian financial 
crisis and the various corporate failures 
and crises in the banking sector (Dermine, 
2013). The study of finance companies 
in Malaysia is important because these 
companies play an important role in the 
implementation of government economic 
programmes and policies such as the 
national economic programme (National 
economic policy, 1971(NEP)/National 
development policy 1991 (NDP) “by 
channelling resources and loans through 
the banks to the desired economic 
sector” (Kim & Rasiah, 2010, p.16). In 
addition, the government has a significant 
investment in the sector and the sector 
makes the largest contribution to GDP 
after the manufacturing, trade and service 
sectors (Economic Planning Unit, 2011).
 Prior studies have found that 
the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance 
is inconclusive and is influenced by the 
firm’s characteristics and other factors 
beyond the firms’ control, implying that 
the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and performance is not clear 
and differs within industries/sectors and 
between companies (Brown et al., 2011). 
In addition, prior studies on the impact of 
ownership structure, independent chair and 
firm performance have reported varying 
results. This contradictory evidence on 
the impact of ownership structure and 
independent chair suggests that ownership 
structure and independence of board 
chair may not have direct effect on firm 
performance. In addition, from the agency 
theory perspective, duality may harm firm 
performance since the chair will perform 
roles both as CEO and board chair, 
which could hinder effective monitoring 
especially in firms with dispersed 
ownership. From another perspective, the 
stewardship theory suggests that combining 
board chair and CEO position will enhance 
coordination and speed in decision 
making since there will not be conflict of 
interest between CEO and board chair. 
Furthermore, combining the positions is 
more beneficial in firms with concentrated 
ownership since owners usually participate 
actively in managing the firms. This 
suggests that further study is needed. It 
further means that the independent chair 
may have a different effect on performance. 
Furthermore, previous studies did not 
give adequate attention to the moderating 
effect of the independent chair on the 
relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance (Hsu, Wang & 
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Hsu, 2012). If the moderating role is not 
examined, the influence of both ownership 
and board attributes on firm performance 
may not be fully considered. This could 
explain the reason why prior studies are 
inconsistent since the impact of ownership 
and board attributes on performance may 
be dependent on other factors. Therefore 
this study included the moderating variable 
in order to put the moderating role of 
the independent chair in the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm 
performance in proper context.
The study contributes to literature 
by examining the moderating role of the 
independent board chair in the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm 
performance in finance companies. The 
study will enable investors to make informed 
decisions on the nature of governance in the 
firm in which they want to invest. The study 
provides policy makers and practitioners 
with a better understanding of the role of 
the independent chair in governance based 
on the nature of ownership in a firm. The 
study provides directors with information 
on the appropriateness of board leadership 
structure that is suitable to the nature of 
ownership structure in their company 
and enables them to organise their board 
according to the nature of ownership in 
the company. In addition, the study will 
enhance our understanding of the impact 
of board attributes on the performance 
of companies. Finally, the findings will 
enable regulators to know the appropriate 
mechanism to recommend for companies 
based on the ownership structure of a 
particular company. The rest of the paper 
is organised as follows: Section 2 contains 
a review of literature and hypotheses 
development; Section 3 presents the 
research methodology; Section 4 contains 
the results of the study and Section 5 
presents results from additional analyses 
while section 7 concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Ownership structure as a monitoring 
mechanism is both the internal and 
external monitoring mechanism of 
corporate governance. This is determined 
based on who owns controlling shares in 
a firm by either management/directors, 
founding family, institutional shareholders 
or government (Ghazali, 2010; Aguilera, 
Desender & De Castro, 2011). Prior 
studies have reported that the dispersed 
ownership structure is associated with 
poor performance in Western countries due 
to the high cost and low benefit associated 
with monitoring by dispersed shareholders 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Mokhtar et al., 
2009). Furthermore, ownership structure 
determines the extent of monitoring of 
the company’s affairs. Where there is 
concentration of ownership in the hands 
of a small number of shareholders, these 
shareholders or their representatives 
on the board are likely to be actively 
involved in performing control and 
service functions, thereby reducing agency 
problems and enhancing performance 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989; Shan & Mclver, 
2011). On the contrary, Adnan, Htay, 
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Ab Rashid and Meera (2011) found that 
the concentration of shares is negatively 
related with performance especially where 
it is in the hands of insiders or institutional 
shareholders while Zulkafli and Abdul 
Samad (2007) found that all the types of 
ownership are negatively related with firm 
performance.
Institutional shareholders enhance 
firm performance due to their expertise 
and high monitoring of the companies 
(Aguilera et al., 2011). Their main 
concern is to maximise financial gain 
from their investment. According to 
Haat Abdul Rahman and Mahenthiran 
(2008) investment by foreign institutional 
shareholders increases competition in 
the market and make firms improve their 
governance in order to attract those foreign 
investors. Thus, monitoring of managers 
by institutional investors helps to reduce 
agency problem (Gul, Sajid, Razzaq 
& Afzal, 2012). Praptiningsih (2009) 
found foreign institutional ownership is 
negatively related with firm performance. 
The ownership structure of finance firms in 
Malaysia is characterised by concentration 
of ownership with institutional 
shareholders, family or government as the 
controlling shareholders (Thillainathan, 
1999). Mangena, Taurigana and Chamisa 
(2012) found that concentrated ownership 
is positively related with firm performance 
in a sample of 79 Zimbabwean firms.
The agency theory deals with the 
agency problem that emanates from the 
relationship between the agent and the 
principal that appoints him. The agency 
problem results from the divergence of 
interest between the principal and the 
agent and the majority and the minority 
shareholders (Boyd, Haynes & Zona, 
2011). From the agency theory perspective, 
duality indicates combination of decision 
making and control, which means the 
board will not be able to monitor the 
CEO effectively, especially in firms with 
dispersed ownership, thereby leading to 
poor performance. On the contrary, the 
stewardship theory suggests that managers 
are concerned about the welfare of the 
owners and overall performance of the 
company, and this contradicts the agency 
theory, which believes that agents are self-
centred and individualistic (Donaldson 
& Davis, 1991). The theory suggests that 
managers will work hard towards the 
attainment of the goal of the owners (Boyd 
et al., 2011). 
Based on the stewardship theory, 
duality creates unity of command at the 
top of the firm thereby reducing problems 
since authority is concentrated in one 
person, therefore facilitating timely and 
effective monitoring. This is particularly 
applicable to firms in developing countries 
where ownership is concentrated and the 
owners participate actively in management 
of the firm. Therefore, as suggested by the 
assumptions of the stewardship theory, 
firm performance will be enhanced if 
the executive have more powers and are 
trusted to run the firm. The theory believes 
that the combination of board chair and 
CEO will increase effectiveness and 
produce superior results than would the 
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 22 (S): 141 – 162 (2014)
Nur Ashikin Mohd Saat and Basiru Salisu Kallamu
148
separation of the roles (Al Mamun, Yasser 
& Rahman, 2013). A study by Donaldson 
and Davis (1991) found that a company 
that has a unitary leadership structure has 
better performance, which is depicted by 
an improvement in the return on equity 
compared to a company that separates the 
two functions. This could be as a result 
of absence of conflict in positions of 
responsibility and authority, which could 
result if the two roles are separated.
Hypotheses development
Moderating role of independent board 
chair 
The requirements of the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
and the governance guide issued by the 
Central Bank requires the board chair to 
be separate from the CEO. In addition, the 
MCCG requires that the board should be 
independent and, where the chair is not 
independent, the majority of the board 
must be independent directors. Several 
studies have examined the impact of board 
attributes on the performance of companies 
(e.g. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pearce & 
Zahra, 1991; Abdul Kadir, 1999; Ghazali, 
2010; Adnan et al., 2011; Shan & Mclver, 
2011). However, the specific role of 
independent board chair in moderating the 
relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance has 
been given less attention (Hsu, Wang & 
Hsu, 2012). In addition, the results of prior 
studies, some of which will be discussed 
below, have also reported mixed results 
indicating that more research is needed to 
test the indirect impact of the independent 
board chair in the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. 
Therefore, this study examines the 
moderating role of the independent board 
chair in the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance.  
The Malaysian code on corporate 
governance requires companies to have a 
separate board chair and CEO and where 
the roles are combined explanation should 
be given in the accounts (MCCG, 2007). 
The separation of the roles will ensure that 
no one person or group will dominate the 
board. The separation or combination of 
the role influences the speed and quality of 
directors’ decisions and the potential board 
contribution to company performance 
(Zahra & Pearce, 1989). There is mixed 
opinion from the theoretical perspective 
and evidence reported by researchers on 
the impact of combining or separating 
the role of chair and chief executive of a 
company. Some argue that by combining 
the roles, management will be better 
monitored and efficiency will be enhanced 
due to the reduction in information 
asymmetry (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). 
According to Ghazali (2010) separation of 
board leadership and management of the 
company may not be an efficient corporate 
governance mechanism especially in 
developing countries where the owners 
are involved actively in the day-to-
day operations of the companies. In his 
experience as board of director members 
holding influential positions such as board 
chairman, CEO and both chairman and 
Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 22 (S): 141 – 162 (2014)
Ownership Structure, Independent Chair and Firm Performance
149
CEO, William (2013), when observing the 
board of director as someone outside of 
the company, found that it is important to 
assess the conduct of independent directors, 
leaders of the board when the chairman 
and CEO positions were combined, leader 
of the board when the chairman position 
was distinct from CEO and CEO when the 
chairman position was distinct from CEO 
to understand how the board of directors 
managed and governed the company to 
achieve results. Evaluating their leadership 
responsibilities and their actions in 
determining what worked for the company, 
it was found that their knowledge, skills 
and experience contributed strategically 
to company value and helped in managing 
internal and external challenges facing the 
company. Succession planning can explain 
a lot about how the company benefitted 
from all these efforts. On the other hand, 
Gerrish (2014) analysed the board of 
chairmen of banks based on their types 
and traits to understand their management 
approach and leadership contribution to the 
company. He revealed that when the bank 
chairman was an independent member not 
holding an executive position in the bank, 
there was micro-management of the bank 
as the day-to-day operation of the bank was 
managed by the executives of the bank. On 
the other hand, if the bank chairman was its 
CEO, decisions at board level were vetted by 
the CEO. In terms of what needed to be done 
to improve the situation in banks, Pozen 
(2010) and Krawcheck (2012) consented for 
the bank’s board of directors to be smaller in 
size; for the board to be led by professional 
board members recruited on full-time basis 
so that they would commit their time to board 
responsibilities and for the bank executive’s 
compensation to be tied to the bank’s fixed 
earnings to align and manage their actions in 
accordance with the bank’s risk sensitivity.  
Listed firms in Malaysia categorise 
shareholdings by directors into direct 
and indirect ownership. Direct ownership 
is stake owned by a director directly in 
his name while indirect ownership is 
through a firm or firms controlled by the 
director. Prior studies examining impact 
of director ownership have examined 
such relationships based on proportion of 
ownership by directors without classifying 
it into direct and indirect ownership. Direct 
ownership by a director means he has a 
direct stake in the company while indirect 
ownership is shares owned by a director 
through the firm he controls or through 
the shareholders he represents. From the 
agency theory perspective, when a director 
has direct ownership he will be more 
interested in monitoring the firm because 
of the monetary loss he could suffer in the 
event the company runs into problems. 
Ownership by institutional shareholders 
enhances performance through increased 
monitoring of the management (Brown et 
al., 2011). Thus, monitoring of managers 
by institutional investors helps to reduce 
agency problem (Gul et al., 2012) and 
encourages investment by outsiders. 
Conversely, monitoring by institutional 
investors could put a constraint on top 
executive decision-making because close 
monitoring may suppress a manager’s 
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ability to make decisions (Aguilera 
et al., 2011). In addition, institutional 
ownership may promote further 
problems between the majority and 
minority shareholders when the interest 
of the institutional shareholders differs 
from that of the minority shareholders 
and leads to poor performance since the 
majority shareholders will promote their 
own interest at the expense of the interest 
of the minority, thereby appropriating 
firm assets to themselves (Park & Jang, 
2010). Institutional investors have 
access to better information compared to 
ordinary shareholders due to their quality 
research and analytical skills (Borisova, 
Brockman, Salas & Zagorchev, 2012). 
Zulkafli and Abdul Samad (2007) 
also found that ownership by large 
shareholders has a negative impact on 
performance of banks and non-finance 
firms while Praptiningsih (2009) found 
no relation in a sample of banking firms 
in some selected Asian countries.
Government owned companies have 
better governance practices because of 
the comprehensive supervision by the 
government that reduces the problem 
of information asymmetry and controls 
the actions of the managers (Samaha & 
Dahawy, 2010). On the contrary, Berger, 
Clarke, Cull, Klapper and Udell (2005), 
D’Souz Megginson and Nash (2007) and 
Praptiningsih (2009) argued that state 
ownership does not enhance firm value 
and the government is not an efficient 
monitoring mechanism. Karas, Schoors 
and Weill (2008) reported that domestic 
public banks had better performance than 
domestic private banks in Russia. 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) 
and Westman (2009) also found that 
state ownership is significantly related to 
profitability. Although state ownership is 
expected to enhance performance through 
enhanced governance in companies, 
their ownership in companies could 
affect performance due to the divergence 
in their interest and the shareholder 
value maximisation; government may, 
for example, employ more people 
to reduce unemployment even if the 
employment will not add value to the 
firms (Megginson, 2005). Borisova et 
al. (2012) found that state ownership 
reduced the number of committees in a 
company, increasing CEO power thereby 
reducing the monitoring mechanisms in 
the firm, while the presence of golden 
shares usually owned by the government 
caused damage to the governance of 
companies. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2013) found 
that director ownership and CEO duality 
were positively and negatively related 
to operating performance while both did 
not have a significant relationship with 
market based measures of performance. 
In addition, Chhaochharia, Kumar and 
Niessen-Ruenzi (2012) examined the 
impact of foreign and local institutional 
investors on corporate governance in 
firms and found that firms with high 
ownership by local institutions had 
better governance and performed better 
due to the enhanced monitoring by the 
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local investors who had better access 
to information compared to the foreign 
investors. Gul, Sajid, Razzaq and Afzal 
(2012) investigated the role of ownership 
structure and corporate governance 
in mitigating agency cost based on a 
sample of 50 listed firms in Pakistan for 
the period 2003 to 2006. The result of the 
regression analysis showed that director 
ownership, institutional ownership and 
separate board leadership lower agency 
cost. 
Ponnu (2008) found no significant 
relationship between duality and firm 
performance. Praptiningih (2009) and 
Zulkafli and Abdul Samad (2007) both 
reported negative relationship between 
duality and firm performance in both 
finance and non-finance companies. They 
added that CEO duality was harmful to 
the performance of a company. Unitary 
leadership structure made it difficult 
for the board to monitor and evaluate 
executive performance (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Leadership of the board should 
ensure that the board carried its activities 
in the most effective way and that the 
board was provided with the necessary 
information on a timely basis (Brown 
et al., 2011). On the other hand, the 
chief executive officer was the head of 
management of a company and was in 
charge of the day-to-day operations of the 
company as well as overall strategy and 
investment. Therefore, most corporate 
governance codes require the separation 
of the leadership roles in a company to 
ensure a balance of power and authority 
and proper monitoring of activities of 
the management (MCCG, 2007). Based 
on these arguments, the following 
hypotheses were tested:
H1: Independent board chair positively 
moderates the relationship between 
direct director ownership and firm 
performance.
H2: Independent board chair positively 
moderates the relationship between 
indirect director ownership and firm 
performance.
H3: Independent board chair positively 
moderates the relationship between 
institutional ownership and firm 
performance.
H4: Independent board chair positively 
moderates the relationship between state 
ownership and firm performance.
METHODOLOGY
The population of the study comprised 
firms listed under the finance sector of 
the main market of Bursa Malaysia. The 
number of firms listed on the main market 
of Bursa Malaysia as at the time of data 
collection (2012) was 822, out of which 
37 were finance firms. Since the number 
of finance companies listed on the main 
market was only 37, all the companies 
were used as the sample for this study. 
This comprised companies involved in 
commercial, investment and Islamic 
banking, Insurance, Takaful and other 
finance-related services. A summary 
of the distribution of the sample firms 
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according to segments of the industry is 
given in Table 1 below. The companies 
listed under the Ace market are not 
included due to their small number and 
because they are subject to different 
listing requirements.
The study used secondary data 
extracted from the annual reports of 
companies listed on the main market of 
Bursa Malaysia. The annual reports were 
downloaded from the website of Bursa 
Malaysia or company website. The data 
comprised corporate governance and 
finance data. The corporate governance 
data were manually extracted from the 
annual reports of the companies while 
the financial information was obtained 
from the Bloomberg data base. The unit 
of observation involved 37 finance 
companies and the observation period 
covered year end 2007 to 2011. Many 
finance firms around the world were 
affected by the impact of the global 
financial crisis. However, Malaysian 
finance firms felt the impact in the form 
of falling share prices, loan applications 
and low inflow of capital (Khoon & 
Mah-Hui, 2010). This study used both 
accounting (ROA) and market measure 
of performance (Tobin’s Q) similar to 
prior studies such as Abdullah, (2004), 
Mokhtar et al., (2009) and Zulkifli 
and Abdulsamad (2007). This is to 
ensure that one complemented the 
other since both had strengths and 
weaknesses. Although market measures 
of performance “are more objective than 
accounting based measures,” they are 
“also affected by some factors beyond 
control of the management” (Gani & 
Jermias, 2006; p.303). 
TABLE 1
List of Sample Firms According to Segments of the 
Finance Industry
Segment No of firms
Commercial banking 2
Islamic banking 1
Investment banking 6
Universal banking 10
Insurance 6
Takaful 3
Others 9
Total 37
Accounting based measures are 
preferable in the context of a corporate 
governance study because they reflect 
the ability of the management to add 
value to the firm (Hutchinson & Gul, 
2004). According to Westman (2009), 
the starting point for evaluating the 
performance of banks is the 
efficiency of their operations. 
Similar to prior studies, in order to reduce 
the possibility of wrong conclusions 
that could result from omitting variables 
that can predict performance and also to 
reduce omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity problem, two control 
variables (firm size and leverage) were 
added to the regression model (Pathan, 
2009; Praptiningsih, 2009; Tao & 
Hutchinson, 2012). Multiple regression 
analysis was used to test the relationship. 
The hypotheses developed above were 
examined by the following model:
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FPit = a0+β1 DDOit + β2 IDDOit
+ β3 IO + β4 GOit 
+ β5 DDO*IDBit  
+ β6  IDDO*IDBit  
+ β7  IO*IDBit + β8 GO*IDBit 
+ β9 FSIZEit +β10 LEVit + YD 
+ εit   
The variables in the research model were 
operationalised as follows:
FP =  firm performance (ROA and 
Tobin’s Q)
IDB =  dummy variables of 1 if 
board chair is separate and 
independent zero other wise
DDO =  percentage of direct ownership 
by directors
IDDO =  percentage of indirect 
ownership by directors
IO =  percentage of ownership by 
institutional shareholders
GO =  percentage of ownership by 
government 
SIZE =  log of total assets
LEV = total debt over equity
YD = year dummies
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSIONS
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics presented in 
Table 2 below indicates that the data was 
normally distributed since the skewedness 
and kurtosis values were less than ±3.00 
and ±10.00 (Kline, 1998). In addition to 
the test of normality based on skewedness 
and kurtosis for individual variables, 
a group normality test was performed 
for the model and the result indicated 
that there was no normality problem. 
Furthermore, a heteroskedasticity test was 
performed and the heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problem were addressed 
using the heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors and white diagonal method 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
respectively. The result of the descriptive 
statistics indicated that only 26% of the 
firms had an independent board chair, 
implying that the majority of the firms did 
not comply with regulatory requirement 
for independent board chair.
TABLE 2
Summary of Results of Descriptive Statistics
ROA DV DDO IO GO FS LEV CINED
Mean  0.024  0.007  0.030  0.503  0.117  0.043  0.064  0.260
Median  0.015  0.010  0.001  0.520  0.004  0.038  0.040  0.000
Maximum  0.079  0.013  0.240  0.900  0.845  0.088  0.310  1.000
Minimum  0.002  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.025 0.025  0.000
Std. Dev.  0.019  0.004  0.059  0.276  0.197  0.012  0.056  0.440
Skewedness  1.253 -1.134  2.106 -0.209  1.924  0.737  1.183  1.090
Kurtosis  3.265  2.362  6.144  1.675  5.916  2.675  4.725  2.190
Obs.  185 185 185 185 185 185 185 185
Note: ROA= return on assets, DV=Tobin’s Q, DDO=direct director ownership, IDDO=indirect director 
ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government ownership, FS = firm size, LEV = leverage, 
CINED=independent board chair
The linearity assumption of the OLS regression is also fulfilled since the values based on the Q-Q plot were 
within ±3.00 range. Furthermore, the variables in the model showed no indication of a multicollinearity problem 
since none of the bivariate correlation is greater than 0.7 as presented in Table 3 below (Pallant, 2005). 
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TABLE 3
Results of Correlation Analysis
ROA DV DDO IO GO FS LEV CINED
ROA  1.000
DV -0.048  1.000
DDO -0.024  0.167  1.000
IDDO  0.284 -0.228  0.070
IO -0.138  0.164  0.042  1.000
GO -0.182 -0.142 -0.195 -0.332  1.000
FS -0.003  0.064 -0.099  0.208  0.062  1.000
LEV -0.468 -0.356 -0.162 -0.138  0.445  0.082  1.000
CINED  0.181  0.084 -0.206  0.060 -0.019  0.008 -0.132  1.000
Note: ROA= return on assets, DV=Tobin’s Q, DDO=direct director ownership, IDDO=indirect director 
ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government ownership, FS=firm size, LEV=leverage, 
CINED=independent board chair
TABLE 4
Summary of Multivariate Regression Based on ROA
 OLS  REM  FEM
Constant  2.419(2.552)***  2.654(2.566)***  2.426(2.123)**
DDO -0.003(-0.155)  0.018(0.414) -0.004(-0.219)
IDDO  0.034(3.385)*** -0.035(-1.073)  0.034(3.134)***
IO -0.007(-1.335) -0.029(-1.175) -0.007(-1.362)
SO  0.003(0.435)  0.042(1.276)  0.003(0.411)
DDO*CINED  11.9090.406) -8.514(-0.377) -14.73(-0.638)
IDDO*CINED  0.294(0.113)  0.040(0.010) -8.365(-1.000)
IO*CINED -1.249(-1.313) -0.239(-0.188)  0.749(0.430)
GO*CINED  4.688(1.963)*  5.551(1.580)  11.086(1.864)*
Firm size  27.558(1.491)  11.755(0.621)  7.762(0.361)
Leverage -23.825(-6.116)*** -18.822(-3.689)*** -13.618(-2.008)**
Year dummies  0.283(0.397)  0.287(0.580)  0.274(0.553)
 Year dummies  0.376(0.526)  0.339(0.682)  0.329(0.659)
 Year dummies  0.312(0.436)  0.354(0.708)  0.380(0.752)
 Year dummies  1.516(2.098)**  1.581(3.134)***  1.638(3.236)***
R2  0.209  0.136  0.698
Adjusted R2  0.163  0.086  0.596
F-statistics  4.560***  2.722***  6.842***
Durbin-Watson  0.871  1.794  2.268
Hausman’s Test  NA  16.129(0.096)  NA
NOTE: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DDO*CINED=interacting 
variable for direct director ownership and independent chair, IDDO*CINED=interacting variable for indirect 
director ownership and independent chair, IO*CINED=interacting variable for institutional ownership and 
independent chair, GO*CINED=interacting variable for government ownership and independent chair. 
CINED=independent board chair
Multivariate regression analyses
Results of regression analysis based on 
ROA
The result of Hausman’s test indicated 
that the random effect model was the most 
appropriate model and the results presented in 
Table 4 indicate an adjusted R2 of 8.6%. The 
f-statistics (f=2.722) obtained was large and 
the corresponding p-value was significant. 
However, none of the individual variables 
was significant while control variable 
leverage was significant but negatively 
related with ROA. The results indicated that 
none of the hypotheses was supported. 
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Results of regression analysis based on 
Tobin’s Q
The results presented in Table 5 indicate 
an adjusted R2 of 11% based on Tobin’s Q 
for the model that tests the moderating role 
of the independent chair in the relationship 
between ownership and firm performance. 
The f-statistics (f=3.360) obtained was 
large and the corresponding p-value 
was significant. The result indicated that 
institutional ownership was negatively 
related with firm performance while 
independent board chair significantly 
(p<0.01) moderated the relationship 
between indirect director ownership 
and Tobin’s Q although negatively. The 
negative association was theoretically 
contrary to the agency theory, which 
suggests that presence of an independent 
chair is a good monitoring mechanism 
since the independent chair would ensure 
that the interest of directors who are the 
majority shareholders was aligned with the 
interest of other shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In addition, the result is 
theoretically in line with arguments based 
on the stewardship theory, which suggests 
that separating the role of CEO and chair 
could stifle the CEO’s innovativeness, lead 
to lack of coordination and cause delay 
in decision-making (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991). 
This shows that with majority 
shareholdings by directors, independent 
dual board leadership may not enhance 
market performance. This is supported by 
the stewardship theory, which suggests 
that dual board leadership may not be 
an efficient monitoring mechanism as 
independent directors may lack experience 
about the business or industry (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991). The control variable leverage 
was significant but negatively related with 
Tobin’s Q while the remaining variables 
were insignificant. 
TABLE 5
Summary of Multivariate Regression Based on Tobin’s Q
 OLS  REM  FEM
Constant  0.008(6.903)***  0.008(6.575)***  0.010(6.320)***
DDO  0.007(1.716)* -0.000(-0.392)  0.001(0.262)
IDDO -0.008(-3.473)*** -0.000(-0.359) -0.005(-2.216)**
IO -0.000(-0.279) -0.002(-2.066)**  0.000(0.446)
SO -0.001(-0.904) -0.001(-0.845) -0.002(-1.21)
DDO*CINED  0.013(0.347)  0.004(0.130)  0.001(0.045)
IDDO*CINED -0.006(-1.970)* -0.008(-1.869)* -0.023(-1.944)*
IO*CINED  6.61E(0.053) -0.000(-0.482) -0.001(-0.843)
GO*CINED  0.005(1.928)*  0.004(0.906) -0.000(-0.035)
Firm size  0.030(1.298)  0.026(1.042)  0.019(0.642)
Leverage -0.030(-6.030)*** -0.032(-4.841)*** -0.035(-3.678)***
Year dummies 7.94E-(0.087)  0.000(0.188)  0.000(0.277)
Year dummies  0.001(1.099)  0.001(1.457)  0.001(1.503)
Year dummies -0.000(-0.217) -0.000(-0.329) -0.000(-0.574)
Year dummies -0.000(-0.725) -0.000(-1.049) -0.000(-1.128)
R2  0.212  0.162  0.623
Adjusted R2  0.167  0.114  0.497
F-statistics  4.676***  3.360***  4.940***
Durbin-Watson  0.815  1.335  1.748
Hausman’s Test  NA  10.025(0.438)  NA
NOTE: ***, **, * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DDO*CINED=interacting 
variable for direct director ownership and independent chair, IDDO*CINED=interacting variable for indirect 
director ownership and independent chair, IO*CINED=interacting variable for institutional ownership and 
independent chair, GO*CINED=interacting variable for government ownership and independent chair. 
CINED=independent board chair
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Evidence presented in the literature shows 
that there is time difference between the 
time a corporate governance mechanism 
is instituted and the time it creates impact 
on the performance of a company (Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006; Ntim, 2009). Therefore, 
similar to previous studies (Arellano & 
Bond, 1991) and in order to control for the 
potential problem of endogeneity, the model 
was re-estimated using generalised methods 
of moment to determine the extent to which 
the result presented was robust to any 
potential endogeneity problem. Estimating 
a model based on the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) is one of the ways in which 
endogeneity might be addressed. The results 
of the estimation based on the GMM model 
are presented side by side with the results 
based on the FEM model in order to enable 
comparison. The results of the estimation 
based on least squares for ROA and Tobin’s 
Q are presented in column 2 and 3 while the 
results based on GMM model are presented 
in column 4 and 5 respectively. 
The results obtained from the least 
squares model were similar to the results 
presented in Table 6 for the GMM except for 
small cases of sensitivities. The coefficient 
of interaction between direct ownership 
by directors and the independent board 
changed from insignificant to statistically 
significant under ROA and from positive to 
negative under Tobin’s Q. The coefficient 
for interaction between indirect ownership 
and board chair changed from positive to 
negative under ROA and from significant 
to statistically insignificant under Tobin’s 
Q while the coefficient of interaction 
between institutional ownership and board 
chair changed from negative to positive 
under Tobin’s Q but remained insignificant. 
The coefficient of firm size changed from 
positive to negative under ROA. Lastly, 
the coefficient of leverage changed from 
statistically significant to insignificant under 
Tobin’s Q but remained in the same direction.
TABLE 6
Summary of Estimation Based on Generalised Method of Moments
 least squares models Generalised method of moments
 ROA(FEM)   Tobin’s Q (FEM)  ROA Tobin’s Q
Constant  2.654(2.566)***   0.008(6.575)***      -        -
DDO*CINED -8.514(-0.377)   0.004(0.130) -0.187(-1.699)* -0.037(-1.274)
IDDO*CINED  0.040(0.0105) -0.008(-1.869)* -0.126(-1.499) -0.005(-0.485)
IO*CINED -0.239(-0.188) -0.000(-0.482) -0.017(-0.919)  0.003(0.685)
GO*CINED  5.551(1.580)  0.004(0.906)  0.016(0.5377)  0.015(1.627)
Firm size  11.755(0.621)  0.026(1.042) -0.011(-0.0759)  0.023(1.051)
Leverage -18.822(-3.689)*** -0.032(-4.841)*** -0.038(-1.720)* -0.012(-1.580)
2007  0.287(0.580)  0.000(0.188)          -       -
2008  0.339(0.682)  0.001(1.457) -0.002(-0.6953)  0.000(0.814)
2009  0.354(0.708) -0.000(-0.329) -0.001(-0.5266) -0.000(-0.419)
2010  1.581(3.134)*** -0.000(-1.049)  0.005(1.235) -0.000(-1.632)
R2  0.136   0.162         -       -
Adjusted R2  0.086   0.114         -       -
F-statistics  2.722***   3.360***         -       -
Durbin-Watson  1.794   1.335         -       -
Hausman’s Test  16.129(0.096)   10.025(0.438)         -       -
J-statistics     -      -  2.279(0.1311)  0.073(0.786)
Wald test     -      -  87.574***  51.294***
NOTE:*, **. *** Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Coefficient presented first and t-statistics in 
parenthesis. ROA=return on asset, REM=random effect method, fixed effect method. DDO=direct director 
ownership, IDDO=indirect director ownership, IO=institutional ownership, GO=government ownership, 
FS=firm size, LEV=leverage, CINED=independent board chair
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Finally, although some variables were 
sensitive to the estimation of GMM model, 
overall, the results showed that the majority 
of the variables in the model were robust for 
estimation based on the GMM model and 
robust to potential endogeneity problem. 
The sensitivity could be explained by the 
time lag between the time the mechanism 
was instituted and the time it took to 
create impact on the relationship between 
the independent board chair and firm 
performance. It could also be the result of 
the reduction in the number of periods of 
observation and lastly, the problem in the 
model such as omitted variable bias could 
have accounted for the sensitivities.
CONCLUSION
Previous studies examining the impact of 
corporate governance on firm performance 
have only examined the direct influence 
of corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm performance while the moderating 
effect was not examined. This has led 
to conflicting and inconsistent findings 
on the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. 
Absence of research on the moderating 
role of the independent chair means that 
the role of the independent chair has not 
been fully explored and understood. This 
paper examined the moderating role of the 
independent board chair in the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm 
performance. The study used a sample of 
37 finance companies listed on the main 
market of Bursa Malaysia from 2007 to 
2011 and yielded results indicating that 
an independent board chair negatively 
moderated the relationship between indirect 
ownership by directors and Tobin’s Q. The 
study provided evidence for the interacting 
role of the independent board chair in the 
relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance. The findings 
suggested that the independent board chair 
influences the strength and direction of the 
relationship between ownership structure 
and firm performance. The findings implied 
that the recommendation of the central 
bank for companies to have an independent 
board chair may not be appropriate for 
companies with high director ownership 
if the companies want to get high market 
valuation. 
The study highlighted the fact that 
although corporate governance mechanisms 
may enhance performance, their impact on 
performance may be indirect and could be 
influenced by the nature of ownership in the 
firm. The study was robust to the potential 
problem of endogeneity since the results 
obtained based on GMM model estimation 
are similar to the estimation based on the 
least squares model with the exception of 
a few cases of sensitivities. The study was 
limited to only finance companies and 
based on data related to a five-year period 
from 2007 to 2011. Future studies could 
increase the sample and observation period. 
Inclusion of unlisted companies and taking 
a sample from other sectors and economies 
could provide more evidence and enhance 
generalisability of the findings. 
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